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Networks Actual and Potential: Think Tanks, War Games and the Creation of Contemporary American Politics

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1.

The months leading up to the U.S. incursion into Iraq in 2003 witnessed one of the largest protest movements in world history, unprecedented in its international scope, with rallies being held simultaneously in over forty countries across four continents. Even as the protests were building momentum, a group of us from Johns Hopkins University, peripherally involved with the anti-war movement, began to feel a different kind of anxiety.¹ What would be the future orientation of this movement once the invasion began and the initial momentum of the protests began to subside? Would it be simply to re-iterate that Bush is, and had been, unusually stupid? Beyond a point there seemed nothing particularly radical about that. And, despite our continued participation in the movement, we were equally worried by the intellectual and moral certainties of the anti-war rhetoric, which left very little room for future (anticipatory?) thought except to demand punitive or reparative action *a posteriori* and to await the next crisis. The present, it seems, had fallen out of our grasp. How did such a situation emerge?

2.

At the same time within the United States, as in several parts of the world, the problem of Homeland Security has come to be surrounded by a distinctive sense of panic, which we ourselves came to feel at various moments. News of the deteriorating situations in Afghanistan and in Iraq are accompanied by reports of the "largest Executive Branch transformation in half a century with the Department of Homeland Security" in the United States.² "The state of emergency has now become the rule rather than the exception." We hear this claim across the entire political spectrum, in progressive journals of social theory and philosophy,

conservative manuals of public policy, government legislations, activist reports, and op-ed pieces, although each may attribute the cause of this apparent shift to a different source. Such a claim is repeatedly, urgently mobilized with the body politic being trained to embody the currently endorsed level of anxiety in yellow, orange and red.

3.

Within such an atmosphere, of certainty conjoined with panic, what constitutes a radical perspective? What tasks might radical scholarship set for itself? Words such as Democracy, Justice, Freedom, and Revolution have been used so often, by so many people, first and foremost by the Bush administration, that it would be completely disabling if the only work left to do were to adjudicate their "correct" or "truthful" application. Finding ourselves at a loss, as a first step we felt it crucial to address that which lay closest to us, which, given our location within the academy, meant returning to the question of intellectuals and power, or the intellectual life of power, in all its specificity, within the American context. With such an inquiry in mind we began to investigate the set of networks and institutions known as think tanks, seemingly the most crucial intellectual node in what is commonly known as the military-industrial complex.

4.

Having set ourselves this task, the question arises: hasn't such an inquiry been undertaken several times before? Indeed, all the empirical material for this argument, including think tank reports and self-descriptions, government documents and news archives, are publicly available, often less than a click away on the Internet. And there is no lack within existing social science literature or, more recently, on activist listservs of detailed descriptions of think tanks, of their politically implicated histories, and the neo-conservative takeover of American politics. Although motivated by many of these same concerns, our essay enters this terrain of inquiry at a slightly different angle of participation. We might present our mode of engagement as follows: In 1993, immediately after his tenure as Secretary of Defense in the administration of George Bush (Sr.), the current Vice-President Richard Cheney joined the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a think tank closely linked to the Republican Party since the time of the Reagan administration. Cheney then left the AEI in 1995 to become the Chairman of the Halliburton Company. Recently,

under Cheney's tenure as Vice-President of the United States, Halliburton has won large-scale contracts for the "reconstruction" of Iraq. Presented as such Cheney fits perfectly within a narrative of conspiracy. Our interest, however, is much less to uncover or to expose backroom dealings. Indeed, contrary to the conspiratorial view, we might point out that at no point did either Cheney or any of his colleagues in the AEI or Halliburton act *against* the law. Our aim, then, is to understand the conditions of possibility that *legitimate*, or even foster, such fluidity of movement between governments, think tanks, commerce, and warfare.

5.

At this stage of our project, we are attempting to study the historical trajectory and conceptual underpinning of one think tank in particular, the RAND Corporation, which seems to provide the conditions of possibility for the entire think tank industry as it presently exists. The problem of "conditions of possibility" requires us to focus more closely on the creative or productive aspects of think tank practice, that is, to ask what it is that they do, or how they function. This question has a slightly different emphasis from an investigation that seeks only to reveal the political agendas of think tanks. Posing the question thus is crucial in relation to the problem of a radical perspective, or the loss of it, with which we began our paper. What would we take the term radicalism to mean? Some of the most positive synonyms might be "thinking at the limit", "attentive and alert to changes at various levels", or "fostering and creating new linkages". The RAND Corporation lays claim upon all such meanings of the term "radical." It is this claim that we engage, treating it with some caution, taking account both of the possibilities it has engendered as well as the serious threats that it poses. At a more distinctly philosophical level, our inquiry is one regarding "thinking", since this is what think tanks supposedly do. What is called thinking? This was perhaps the inaugural question of Western philosophical modernity, concerned right from the start, say with Galileo or Descartes, with the promise of applied mathematics, an issue crucial to the emergence of think tanks, as we will show. In relation to think tanks, our picture of thinking moves in two related directions, a) concepts & institutions and b) technologies & the problem of warfare, which respectively compose the two distinct phases of our argument.

I. Concepts & Institutions: Throughout the Middle Ages and Western classical antiquity, the role of the political expert was to produce a genre of writing characterized as "advice to the prince." In the United States, from about the mid twentieth century onwards, the institution of the think tank emerges to fill this role in a specifically modern/late modern form, as the *art of government* turns into a managerial *science*. How does this happen? In this section we describe the emergence of the RAND Corporation and its knowledge apparatus of systems analysis, the birth of a new phase of American governance characterized by the figure of Robert McNamara, the expansion of think tank capabilities to include social life as a calculable problematic, the gradual proliferation of think tanks besides the RAND Corporation, their close relations with successive presidential candidates, and the subsequent rise of advocacy groups now ubiquitous in contemporary American politics. In the course of this trajectory think tanks become a characteristic form of the way institutions or the government "thinks" within the United States, a mode of governmental-analytical relation to itself and to others, closely joined to and separate from the State at various junctures. Crucially, on the theoretical trajectory we follow, both thinking and the creation of concepts are closely linked to affects.³ We show how the inception of RAND is centrally concerned with the newly urgent problematic of security, a threatening issue starting from the late 1940s with the beginnings of the Cold War. This creates the conditions of possibility for the habitual mode of think tank "thinking-feeling", producing concepts linked to the affective mode of ever-present threat perception, panic and anxiety (over communism, the arms race, nuclear war and more recently over terrorism). The characteristic reaction then is to declare a war of annihilation (war on poverty, war on drugs, war on terror), an affective tendency which exists alongside the strictly rationalist cost-benefit analysis claims of mathematical managerial science.

6.

II. Technologies and the Problem of Warfare: The question concerning technology is equally central here. The RAND Corporation's primary relation with technology has consistently been geared towards the application of scientific research to the problem of warfare. However, we see this as a highly complex issue not easily resolved into "good" and "bad" uses of science or Orwellian "big brother" scenarios. As we point out further on, RAND has been closely involved in the creation of the Internet,

VCRs, and several other technological forms that make up our daily lives with the concomitant possibilities and threats engendered by their assimilation and usage. On this question of daily or social life, we examine continuities between the Rand Corporation's initial concern with warfare and their subsequent turn towards social research. Finally, we consider recent developments within American military theory known as the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)" and DARPA's (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) "Total Information Awareness" Program. We end with an analysis of debates within RAND on the problem of terrorism and the concept of total war, which turns out to have crucial points of continuity with previous modes of thinking-feeling, even as it is consistently declared to be altogether unprecedented and new.

7.

None of this is to say that things have always been the same. Rather, what interests us throughout this analysis are the emergences of and movements between concepts, institutions, technologies, warfare and political life. At the outset we had said that the "present" seems to have fallen out of our grasp. As an attempted cure is this then a "genealogy" of the present, as it is called within social science and philosophy? To some extent that may be the case, but that is not the end of the story, since, for us, the question of temporality is far more complicated. For now we will have to signpost it as a problem to be considered, returning to it in the concluding section of our argument.

I. Concepts and Institutions

Managerial Science, Security and the Centrality of the RAND Corporation

8.

The RAND Corporation is not the first think tank. In 1917, Robert Brookings and Andrew Carnegie had established 'non-partisan' research groups (The Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, respectively) outside the university system to analyze international relations. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace -- which has been home to Condoleezza Rice and other members of the present Bush administration -- began in 1919. But it is only with the establishment of the RAND Corporation in the 1940s that as fluid and intimate a relation as

presently exists between think tanks, the military and the state apparatus first begins to appear. This new relation is able to emerge only after the confluence of economics and applied mathematics results in the highly exacting and technical knowledge apparatus of operations research and systems analysis, which are able to provide procedures to replace partisan or factional political bargaining with efficiency optimization studies and rational choice cost/benefit models.⁴ At the same time the problematic of 'security' takes on an entirely new and unprecedented urgency and form in the United States with the Cold War, the ensuing 'arms race', and the twin threats, ever present and expanding, of nuclear attacks and communism. It is in and through this linkage of a conceptual apparatus to an affective tendency that the think tank emerges as *the* crucial node in a triangular feedback relation among economics, military and the government.

9.

How does the need arise for such an institution and what are the conditions of possibility for its emergence? In the period following the Second World War, after the experience of air raids and large-scale bombings of civilian territories, war and technology enter into a new relation, giving an unforeseen impetus and vastly increased scope to planning. "Warfare is no longer a military problem", declares General Curtis E. LeMay, the Army Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development in August 1947, whose position was created in large part to oversee the newly established Project RAND.⁵ From the 1940s to the 1960s a number of government reports appear, from Paul Nitze's NSC-68 to the Kennedy administration's Symington Committee Report, recommending a drastic strengthening of the armed forces and a centralization of military authority within the government under the new rubric of "national security." The central concern of this incipient intellectual community was to forge a new relation between the civilian scientific community, the different and often competing military services, and the government. The National Security Act of 1947 creates the office of the Secretary for Defense to coordinate the activities of the military services.

10.

However, it was not until the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the subsequent appointment of

Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, that such a fundamental reorganization of the relation between the state and the military apparatus could take place. McNamara, a graduate of Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration, began to use applied mathematics to oversee the overall restructuring of three crucial institutions of late modern globalization: the Ford Motor Company in the mid 1950s (as its President), the U.S. Department of Defense in the 1960s (as the Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) and the World Bank during the 1970s (as its President). Could we say that McNamara has been one of the key "managers" of the twentieth century?

⁶Crucial to McNamara's reorganization of the Pentagon was his encounter with RAND's seminal text, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (1960), co-authored by Charles Hitch and Ronald McKean. This text echoed his own interest in bringing rational management methods, which he earlier championed in industry, to the national security establishment.⁷ When McNamara and RAND's Charles Hitch met in January 1961, it was "love at first sight."⁸ The Kennedy administration then invited several members of RAND to oversee the "civilian" reorganization of the Department of Defense, with Charles Hitch appointed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Comptroller. This move inaugurates a tradition of employment, in both directions, between think tanks and government.

The emergence of the social as a problem for think tanks

11.

After Kennedy's death, as they continued into the Johnson administration, McNamara, Hitch and the RAND executives established procedures of governance within the Department of Defense that came to be known as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) system. Matters would be interesting enough if they stopped with the military. Beginning in the Department of Defense, this form of governmental conceptualization and implementation was subsequently extended to social life. One year into his presidency Johnson launched what he called the "War on Poverty," through the "Great Society" Program, a host of social welfare initiatives launched in a number of cities in the U. S., the basic aim of which was described as the "stabilization of American society."⁹ In August 1965, in order to promote the

centralization of these and other previously existing social welfare programs, Lyndon Johnson prescribed the defense department's PPB System for adoption by all major federal agencies. In his message to Congress on "the quality of American government" on March 17, 1967 Johnson stated, "This system--which proved its worth many times over in the Defense Department--now brings to each department and agency the most advanced techniques of modern business management."¹⁰

12.

While this is an inaugural moment of sorts within the trajectory of American governance, it should not be assumed that there was any kind of overarching consensus on these developments. Each set of events (the emergence of systems analysis, the birth of the national security problematic, the transformation of American military-government relations, the beginnings and internal changes within the Great Society social welfare programs, the restructuring of institutions of international governance such as the World Bank etc.) were each characterized by furious contestation within the military, the state apparatus, as well as academic and policy communities. By the late 1960s, critiques of the systems analysis approach were widely available, the most well-known being Ida Hoos' text *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* (1972), alongside criticisms of mathematical modeling techniques by Wassily Leontief, the Nobel prize winning economist. Subsequent administrations, such as those during the Reagan era, moved far away from Johnson's social welfare approach.

13.

What kind of an inaugural transformation are we then pointing to? Two points are crucial for our analysis with regards to this phase of the emergence of think tanks within the American political landscape:

1) Routes of power: A specific conceptual and institutional route emerges during the McNamara-Hitch-Johnson period between think tanks and the government, organized around the problematic of security. As a result of the creation and subsequent restructuring of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society," domestic urban poverty alleviation programs along the lines of the PPB System, think tanks move

beyond the military into social life in general. In 1966 the RAND Corporation formally diversified from national defense research into social policy studies. By 1972 almost half of RAND's research program was devoted to social welfare, a practice that continues into the present. The Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, founded in 1966 by the Johnson administration's Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), is modeled closely on RAND, as are the Hudson Institute and the Urban Institute which also work on federal contracts.¹¹ Other think tanks began to make similar moves in terms of research output by combining international relations with domestic policy issues. From 1970 onwards the Brookings Institution began to produce a set of influential "budget books" under the heading *Setting National Priorities*, alongside the Brookings 'studies in Social Experimentation'. Thereafter began a major institutional proliferation of think tanks from the late 1960s onwards, most of which did not begin with federal funding as the RAND Corporation did (although all think tanks are tax exempt under the Internal Revenue Code), but with private investment. In most cases such investment comes from industrialists, politicians, issue-based networks, or ex-employees of existing think tanks.¹² As of now, there are over two thousand think tanks in the U.S of different sizes and ideological orientations that produce advisory/policy analysis documents on issues such as military organization, foreign policy, health, welfare, education and international development by utilizing a combination of social, political, economic and mathematical science research methods.

2) Traffic across the routes: The symbiotic routes inaugurated by McNamara-RAND, between government and think tanks subsequently proliferated to the extent that successive presidents came to be associated with the organizations on

which they relied for policy advice and administrative personnel. A brief list would read as follows:

- Jimmy Carter and David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission, a group that was formed to "foster business dialogue amongst industrialized nations", being a precursor to contemporary institutional phenomena such as the World Economic Forum and the G8.

- Roughly half of Ronald Reagan's high-level administration came from think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, in addition to two hundred members from these organizations, who were taken on as full-time consultants or advisors between the years 1981 and 1988.¹³ A few months prior to Reagan's election the Heritage Foundation published its 1100 page magnum opus *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration*, a text that contains roughly 2000 proposals. Legend has it that Reagan handed a copy of this text "to each member of his administration."¹⁴ In early 1982 Edward Feulner of the Heritage Foundation declared that more than 60% of their proposals had been adopted by the Reagan administration.¹⁵

- In 1985, following Walter Mondale's defeat, the Democratic Party created a think tank, the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) whose principal mandate was to move the party from the left to the center of the political spectrum.¹⁶ Apart from being one of its founding members, Bill Clinton was its Chairman in 1990-91, the years immediately prior to his presidency. The Progressive Policy Institute, the policy arm of the Democratic Leadership Council, prepared a blueprint for the incoming administration, *Mandate for Change*, modeled on the Heritage Foundation's *Mandate for Leadership*. Following Clinton's

election the DLC actively lobbied for several presidential policies, in particular devoting considerable resources to convince members of Congress to ratify NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement).¹⁷

- Prior to his election George W. Bush put together a team of over one hundred experts, drawn mostly from the Hoover Institution and the American Enterprise Institute. The present administration draws its personnel largely from that pool, which, particularly in the case of defense and foreign policy, reads "like a Who's Who of the Reagan and Bush (Sr.) foreign policy establishments."¹⁸ Other than Richard and Lynne Cheney's relation to the American Enterprise Institute (Lynne Cheney is presently a Senior Fellow at the AEI), Condoleezza Rice has been a long-time Fellow of the Hoover Institution, while Donald Rumsfeld is the present Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation.

The Rise of Advocacy (and the end of objectivity?): RAND's Heritage Reconsidered

14.

Most commentators on think tanks point to a tectonic shift from the research groups of the 1950s, which aimed to replace factional political bargaining with "non-partisan" procedural knowledge, to the advocacy groups that gained prominence from the 1970s onwards, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, whose principal aim seems to be to further a particular political agenda. Such an interpretation seems plausible given, for instance, the Heritage Foundation's 1998 Annual Report, which describes its public relations program: "provide journalists, opinion leaders, and the general public with the positive message of responsible conservatism and conservatism will remain competitive, and even triumph, in the marketplace of ideas."¹⁹

15.

On this reading it would appear that the original promise of the

think tank, to provide the state apparatus with rational, impartial advice and mathematical analyses, has completely failed, given that these days it is rare to hear any think tank named without a supplementary political appellation of one sort or another, such as the "conservative" American Enterprise Institute, the "liberal" Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, or the "centrist" Brookings Institution. For the purposes of our analysis, however, we are largely uninterested in these qualifications, concentrating instead on movements between concepts, networks and institutions that cannot always be usefully fixed within such pre-given categories²⁰. Moreover, the empirical evidence at hand makes it crucial to recognize both ruptures and continuities between, for instance, RAND and the Heritage Foundation, in what might otherwise seem completely distinct phases of activity or types of institutions.

16.

Are these more recent advocacy groups entirely different from what existed previously? We might re-describe this relation as follows: The period of McNamara and the early years of the RAND Corporation, can only be described as rational and non-partisan with some difficulty. Indeed, their own memoirs, including McNamara's autobiographical accounts describe the disasters of those years.²¹ More importantly, this phase of activity set up a field of incipience and potentialities – modes of thought, forms of action and association – which could be inhabited differently, for better and for worse, by others who wanted to participate in this emergent power formation. The subsequent expansion and continuation that actualized this field of potential was symptomatic of both the characteristic mode of think tank "thinking", namely business management, as also of their central normative principle, one might call it an article of faith, that of a competitive "open" market. The subsequent proliferation of think tanks, after the early RAND dominated years, emerged precisely in this form, such that the field is now referred to as an industry that creates a "marketplace of ideas". In several cases, innovations or success in such a field meant creating tighter and more profitable networks of influence, both public and private, wherein profit and influence were measured in social, political and economic terms. The Heritage Foundation, for instance, shot to prominence with *Mandate for Leadership*, the "blueprint" for the Reagan administration. Their more recent innovations have dispensed with long-term research altogether by producing what

are known as "quick response" studies. These are characterized as "timely", in that their studies are delivered to Congressmen days *before* a bill comes up for debate (this was a major shift from previous think tank procedure when it was considered crucial not to influence voting practices)²² and "succinct" as reports have been drastically shortened into more "readable" forms (the logic being that in most cases public officials do not have the time to sift through lengthy, complex arguments). According to industry legend the Heritage Foundation began to design its reports to be read in twenty minutes, the time it takes on average to travel from Washington Dulles Airport to Capitol Hill. Further, cultivating ties with media networks in the interest of public relations has come to be regarded as central in cornering the "ideas market." In 1998 the Heritage Foundation spent eight million dollars, 18% of its annual budget, on "media and government relations." In the same year roughly one hundred and fifty articles by Heritage Foundation scholars appeared in leading U.S. newspapers such as *The New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, the *Washington Times*, the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Washington Post*.²³ Most think tanks now encourage their scholars to make television appearances, to cultivate relationships with editors and journalists as "experts" on particular issues, to write regular op-ed pieces etc., such that a feedback relation that moves towards the government on the one hand, might loop back into the more amorphous domain of public opinion on the other.

II. Technologies and the Problem of Warfare

Back to the Future

17.

Let us return to the RAND Corporation. Until now we have concentrated largely on their emergence and subsequent influence in the creation of other think tanks, or "advocacy groups" and a more general field of thought, action and association. We can now move closer to the present, paying particular attention to the problem of warfare, within which field RAND still retains some of its constitutive centrality. As a result, concentrating on specific trajectories within RAND also helps us to understand certain key characteristics of the conceptual work performed by think tanks more generally. At present, RAND is composed of three Department of Defense (DOD) sponsored Federally Funded

Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) operating under long term contracts, Project Air Force, the Army's Arroyo Center and the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). Recent documents from RAND and other think tanks inform us of "the Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA,"²⁴ a broad reconfiguration of military and national security theory. Within such a field of supposedly radical rupture, it is crucial to keep track of points of conceptual continuity. In relation to think tank operations, RAND in particular, we can outline three such points:

a) Technology: The extension of man-machine capabilities in relation to warfare, command and control, remains a central problem for think tanks, as it was in the original brief for the creation of the RAND Corporation. The massive apparatus of knowledge generated around this problem has little or nothing to do with either individual or communitarian conceptions of the human, which are supposed to be characteristic divisions of political debate. That is to say, in themselves these concepts are neither liberal nor conservative, since their site of operation (and, therefore, of contestation) is a completely different one, concerned more with the organization and productive relations between human beings and technology. For instance, according to one of its founders, Operations Research (a field crucial to the initial establishment of think tanks) is best described as a form of "quantitative analysis to increase the efficient functioning of man-machine systems."²⁵ While in many cases talk of man-machine relations immediately raises our Orwellian hackles, the question of control is not necessarily as self-evidently absolute as it may initially appear. A telling example would be RAND researcher Paul Baran's concept of "distributed communications" (now called packet switching) created in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in order to design a "command and control" network for the U.S. military that would survive a nuclear attack. Funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (now called DARPA) this

decentralized network, named ARPANET at the time, was first tested in 1969 with its first node installed in UCLA and the seventh node at RAND (RAND Project Air Force 1996: 37). ARPANET subsequently became the present-day World Wide Web. Most recent innovations in RAND military theory, such as "cyber-war" and "netwar," which we discuss below, can be seen as ways of coping with their loss of control over a technology that far outpaced its initially projected utility.

b) Modes of Anticipation: The second point of continuity in terms of think tank "thinking-feeling" centers on their orientation which we might describe as being future-tense. At the same time as the question of technology emerges, the knowledge apparatus around it centrally seeks to lay claims on the future by developing modes of anticipation; that is, by setting out or predicting possibilities in situations of uncertainty. Indeed, the first conceptual formulations around "complex systems" and "uncertainty-sensitive planning" were crucial to RAND's break from the Operations Research paradigm and embrace of Systems Analysis, designed as a "mathematically rigorous means of choosing between alternative future systems..."²⁶ This is accompanied by the emergence of game theory in economics²⁷, alongside war-gaming techniques, simulations, Delphi techniques, and scenario constructions, many of which remain crucial to think tank analysis well into the present. While many of these initial conceptualizations may have reached points of exhaustion in subsequent years, partially discarded in favor of other techniques, the *temporality of the future* and the *realm of potentialities* remain absolutely central to the claims to knowledge and expertise put forward by think tanks. For instance, one of RAND's most recent reports, *Alternative Futures and their Implications for Army Modernization* (2003), is a classic example of "scenario-construction" that sets forth six global futures: U.S. Unipolarity and

Democratic Peace (described as the two best-case scenarios); Major Competitor Rising and Competitive Multi-polarity (two "medium-good" futures); Transnational Web (a "medium-bad" future) and "Chaos-Anarchy" (the "worst case" scenario). In many ways these "scenario-constructions" may appear alternately frightening or utterly laughable. The RAND Corporation, however, prides itself on thinking "out of the box", which carries the risks of both failure and absurdity.²⁸ In 1946, very shortly after its establishment, Project RAND produced a study assessing the feasibility of a world-circling spaceship. At the time of its appearance it was termed improbable at best. However, it turned into a classic example of RAND "success," as it anticipated the race into space between the Soviet Union and the United States by over a decade.

c) Efficiency: The third and final point of continuity concerns the relationship between technology and efficiency. One of the most crucial principles of think tank analysis, "efficiency" has meant that good governance is most often equated to, and criticized from the perspective of "business management". A recent publication of the Heritage Foundation, *An Appropriator's Guide to Homeland Security* (June 7, 2004) puts forward five principles to ensure 'smart spending...for enhancing Homeland Security'. Principle #3 of the guide is "Getting the Biggest Bang for the Buck," a line first put into usage by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s in relation to nuclear warfare, and which subsequently became one of the defining phrases of the think tank industry.²⁹ The same document from the Heritage Foundation continues with what has been the emblematic think tank criticism of government over the past fifty years, as well as their fundamental claim to expertise: "Many of these [federal] funds were spent haphazardly on individual initiatives, some of which were poorly conceived and managed. Most programs bore little

relation to one another..."³⁰ Lines which Robert McNamara could just as easily have written in the 1960s.

Future Shock: The New Intangibles

18.

Within such a field of repetitions, what constitutes the newness of the present moment? Let us look more closely at the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Among the most prominent spokespersons for the RMA are the information age gurus Heidi and Alvin Toffler, whose theories regarding the "Third Wave," "demassification" and the acceleration of time provide an important inspiration for both the Bush administration's doctrine of preemptive warfare and recent RAND Corporation interventions in military and social theory.³¹ The 1997 RAND publication, *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, offers a useful -- although by no means unique -- example of how RAND intellectuals have seized the notion of the RMA to imagine new scenarios in which categories of warfare, weaponry and security are reconfigured. Edited by two RAND veterans, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Athena's Camp*, expands on the "new intangibles" that cyber technologies and network analysis present for the articulation of military strategy in the information age (as distinct from the nuclear age of the Cold War). The guiding paradox for the book's authors resides in the apparent contradiction between the expanding quantity of information that has become available to military and political strategists, and its increasing illegibility. Our reliance on information, as the Tofflers argue in their foreword, presents us with "new intangibles" precisely because the material conditions of its production make it impossible either to locate or to contain the sources, interpretations and "directionality" of information.³² This "same shift towards intangibility" is the defining characteristic of the RMA that the Tofflers summarize as the "shift in the relationship between tangible and intangible methods of production and destruction."³³

Netwar

19.

Cyberwar and netwar are two key concepts in this new approach

towards enhancing legibility in warfare and intelligence. As part of a broad RAND led initiative to imagine new forms of terrorism, Arquilla and Ronfeldt offered the term "netwar" as "both a tool and a prediction."³⁴As a tool, it "refers to conflict (and crime) at societal levels where the protagonists rely on network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies."As a prediction, "it reflects assessments that the information revolution is about organizational design as well as technological prowess, and that this revolution favors whoever can master the network form."³⁵Identifying features of an "archetypal netwar"for Arquilla and Ronfeldt include (1) organization through "diverse, dispersed, often small groups or "nodes""that "act in a highly Internetted "all-channel"manner"; (2) lack of central leadership (referred to as "no precise heart or head that can be targeted"); (3) a "flat and non-hierarchical"organization in which "tactical decision making and operations are decentralized "and "emphasize local initiative". In developing their theory, Arquilla and Ronfeldt draw on work by anthropologists Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine on US Pentecostal movements that are 'segmented, polycentric, and ideologically integrated."³⁶The form of warfare required to combat such organizations, they go on to argue, is unique in two regards: It is fundamentally "about information – about who knows what, when, where and why"; and, secondly, it "involves seeking top-sight or total intelligence about one's own and the opponent's situation, while keeping the opponent in the dark about oneself and about its own situation."³⁷.

20.

A concept such as netwar has infinitely expandable claims to generalizability (indeed, in his recent book *Linked*, Lazlo-Barabasi elevates the "network"to nothing short of a universal principle). In its general applicability, anywhere from Afghanistan to Mexico, the netwar becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.³⁸A striking example of this is Arquilla's and Ronfeldt's choice of the EZLN (*Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional*) as the paradigmatic case of netwar. Ignoring both the complex political and social prehistory of the EZLN, the peculiarly Mexican resonances of its rhetoric and dynamics, and the location of its notions of autonomy and power within the political moment in Mexico, Arquilla and Ronfeldt instead argue that the entire situation in Chiapas was produced through a cabalistic

convergence of "all manner of transnational influences" including the United Nations, the Catholic Church, human rights organizations and "activist NGO's."³⁹ Simultaneously, the newness of the situation is posed, almost uncannily as a repetition of the problem first articulated by their predecessors in the 1950s, "the line between the military and civilian sectors in the United States is blurring, raising prickly new questions about who exactly is responsible for what."⁴⁰

Neo-cortical warfare

21.

Given such imaginative scenarios, it is easy to see why so much RAND thinking about the "revolution" in military affairs has been concerned to re-imagine new forms of warfare that can mimic the protean or mutational qualities assumed by an enemy that is not only invisible and non-locatable, but in many cases illegible in terms of the traditional categories of state and non-state, civilian and military, foreign and domestic. One central component, of course, has been the privatization of military operations through defense and security contracting.⁴¹ Another, however, is the reconfiguration of weaponry itself along lines that encourage a rethinking of the category of the human. In this new vision of warfare, "military power resides in the domain of the mind and the will: the provinces of choice."⁴² Thus, neocortical warfare opens the possibility of imagining a mode of "meeting national security political objectives without force", wherein the term employment comes to "attach more importance to communicating with other minds than to targeting objects."⁴³ This plan for the RMA, in turn, involves a shift in traditional military theory from a focus on the use of physical force to destroy "the brains that host will," to a "quest for metaphysical control."⁴⁴ In order to accomplish this, it is necessary first to distinguish between the mammalian and neocortical levels of the brain, and then to "influence the adversary leaders' perceptions of patterns and images, and shapes insights, imaginings and nightmares."⁴⁵ "Non-fighting is the attribute and aim of neocortical warfare" and "requires a better integrated, joint civilian and military national security control force with both armed and unarmed elements."⁴⁶ Its goals are not to destroy bodies, but rather "to fuel

nightmares"by undermining the "adversary's culture, world view and the representational systems the adversary recognizes, values and uses to communicate intent ...and how the adversary receives, processes and organizes auditory, visual and kinesthetic perceptions."⁴⁷

New Weaponry

22.

The struggle for dominance of the enemy's will centers on the ability to control the legibility of the signatures through which actions can be attributed and claimed. The new forms of weaponry are accordingly imagined to be highly mobile, non-destructive and miniscule. They mimic information technologies through three modes of deployment: pop-up warfare, mesh warfare, and fire-ant warfare.⁴⁸ Consisting primarily of sensors they render information -- or "will"-- rather than the human body, as the principle objective of war. Thus, for example, "pop-up warfare" is a "mode [of warfare] in which elements are hidden and quiet except during those brief and dangerous moments of engagement or movement."⁴⁹ It puts "great premium on minimizing one's own signatures and amplifying the enemy's [signatures]", which can be "harvested by unmanned objects."⁵⁰ Meshes complement "pop-up" sensors in that they "allow their possessors to find anything worth hitting." Military theorist Lipicki cautions, however, that there is a two-fold danger lurking in this focus on detail and scale. The first lies in its element of surprise and capacity to erase human agency in that the "relative trickle of information" about the enemy can suddenly become a "current of data, far more than any human can deal with."⁵¹ The second threat lies in the possibility that warfare itself can become so generalizable as to be both totally illegible and beyond human control. This nightmare/dream scenario is captured via the idea that all forms of mobility including ships, cars, trains and planes can be converted into forms of weaponry whose signature as weaponry can pass through even the finest "mesh." Like internet chatter, weapons can thus multiply and mutate independently of human agency and in such a way that illegibility becomes an essential feature of all actual and potential configurations.

Total Information Awareness

23.

Given that illegibility and the absence of signatures are defined as the crucial problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs, what kinds of solutions are set to emerge? Matters in this regard still seem to be at a rudimentary stage but we might explore one set of aborted trajectories by turning to DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) a governmental organization housed in the Pentagon which often works adjacent to RAND (as it did in the case of ARPANET, when it was still known as ARPA). DARPA's description of its futuristic information retrieval research⁵² combines the urgency produced by a military-bred patriotism with a reputation for being a swashbuckling scientific outfit. DARPA was created in 1958 during the Cold War, when it began to be felt that scientific-military research was becoming too specialized even for existing institutions such as Project RAND to handle.⁵³

24.

Most recently, DARPA returned to the public eye for more ignoble reasons. It was accused of misusing public funds to the tune of \$137 million dollars to invest in an anti-terrorism research initiative infelicitously called "Total Information Awareness"(TIA).⁵⁴ Moreover, the fact that Admiral John Poindexter, the ex-Reaganite infamous for his part in destroying evidence during the Iran Contra Affair, was heading up the initiative made Democrats cry foul that such a disreputable person, a suspected liar, was to be made American's new "big brother."⁵⁵ Poindexter came to DARPA as the Vice President of Syntek Technologies, an Information Technology (IT) company, that was developing the Genoa II algorithm program to allow humans and computers "to think together" and with which DARPA contracted to integrate this program into TIA.⁵⁶ While in office at DARPA, Poindexter also lent TIA's support to the ideas of a George Mason economics professor Robin Hanson who maintained the effectiveness of markets at predicting terrorist events. Hanson proposed to set up a commercial outfit -- to be called Future Markets Applied to Prediction (Future Map) -- that would speculate upon economic, civil, and military futures, in particular, acts of terrorism and assassinations in countries such as, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

This outfit would provide TIA a novel (and profitable) means to anticipate and prepare for the future.⁵⁷

25.

Public furor over the ethics of the program -- which was to be initiated with 10,000 traders and \$8 million in start up money -- forced Poindexter to resign from DARPA on August 2003. The following month, Congress also scrapped the TIA program. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld went so far as to provide the following rather cagey denunciation of TIA/FutureMAP:

It was pretty clear to me it ought to have been cancelled, so I did so...Even if it had been a brilliant idea, which I doubt, it would not have been able to function in the environment that it was created.⁵⁸

26.

However, TIA was only set up after 9/11 to bring together pre-existing research programs within DARPA in a concerted effort to extend this technology towards the war against terrorism. Although TIA was canceled, these programs were allowed to continue as before by approval of Congress:

27.

The only research projects previously under the jurisdiction of the Information Awareness Office that may continue under DARPA are: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages (including Babylon and Symphony).⁵⁹

28.

Paying attention to these programs, existing and abandoned, we can excavate DARPA's diagnosis of vulnerability and its solutions for the "national interest" in an information-saturated world. On August 2, 2002, John Poindexter spoke to those gathered at a DARPA Tech Conference in California in his capacity as Director of TIA. After describing the world today as radically different from the one to which he was most accustomed, that is, the Cold War era in which one "knew" who one's enemy was, he said:

The most serious asymmetric threat facing the United States is terrorism, a threat characterized by collections of people loosely organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and define and whose goals are the destruction of our way of life...

We must find the terrorists in a world of noise." ⁶⁰

29.

Further on, he emphasized the importance of information technology for solving this problem. But what was to be the mode of this identification of the 'meaningful' i.e. the separation of information from noise? Here is Poindexter describing DARPA's initiative:

One of the significant new data sources that need to be mined to discover and track terrorists is the transaction space. If terrorist organizations are going to play and execute attacks against the United States, their people must engage in transactions and they will leave signatures in this information space... This low-intensity/low-density form of warfare has an information signature. We must be able to pick this signal out of the noise. ⁶¹

30.

The idea of signatures is crucial to understanding the correspondence between the individual and his/her electronic transactions. An individual, or even a network operating as an individual for that matter, leaves a mark in their transactions that comprise their information signature. This signature has to be sought out amidst the electronic traffic and continually authenticated, in that it is open to dissimulation or forgery.

31.

Two of the numerous programs which TIA was to oversee had to do with developing tools for the discovery of such signatures, GENISYS, which will "imagine and develop ultra-large-scale, semantically rich, easily implementable database technologies," and EELD (Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery), which is "a key program in the area of tools for discovery of information" that go beyond "traditional data mining technologies." ⁶² Moreover, this idea of signature is not just limited

to an individual/organization/network's electronic transactions for DARPA. It is also extended to the individual's physiognomy. The TIA program, HumanID (Human Identification at Distance) was concerned with achieving "positive identification of humans using multi-modal biometric technologies."⁶³ After Poindexter resigned, he wrote an extensive op-ed piece in the *New York Times* with a title appropriate to the biometric conception: "Finding the Face of Terror".⁶⁴

32.

Alongside physiognomy comes smell. Another DARPA program, not associated with TIA but with DARPA's Advanced Technology Office (ATO) that funds research to aid military conflict, goes by the name of Unique Signatures whose objective is "to determine whether genetically determined odor-types can be used to identify specific individuals, and if so to develop enabling technology for detecting and identifying specific individuals by such odor-types."⁶⁵ Alongside physiognomy and smell comes what is perhaps the most persistent social signature of an individual, namely speech or language. DARPA has numerous programs to enable computer systems, the intelligence community, or the individual soldier to recognize and differentially manipulate speech-related signatures. Currently housed in the Information Processing Technology Office (IPTO) is the Babylon Project, which provides "two-way, natural language speech translation interfaces and platforms for users in combat and other field environments."⁶⁶ Its aim is to provide real-time translation under varying conditions. IPTO also houses the Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (TIDES) program that hopes to provide English speakers the tools "to find and interpret information in multiple languages without requiring knowledge of these languages."⁶⁷

Total War?

33.

Within the emergent, not yet fully formed "solutions" to the problems posed by the Revolution in Military Affairs, it seems that any aspect of everyday life – objects, smells, speech, physiognomy – can turn into a potential source of threat or vulnerability. Is this a symptom of the post-9/11 era, radically new and unprecedented? Let us pay closer attention to the

genealogy of the concept of "terrorism" within the RAND Corporation, as it has emerged over the last few decades, closely linked to the overlapping of the problems of warfare and social life that we described earlier in think tank techniques during Lyndon Johnson's presidency.

Vietnam, 1968

34.

While serving as a Captain in the Special Forces in Vietnam, Brian Jenkins⁶⁸ isolated a troubling paradox regarding the conventional military tactics that were being deployed to locate, isolate, and eliminate enemy combatants. These tactics seemed to be producing statistically positive results for the US Armed Forces based on the standard measures of success or failure in this realm. ⁶⁹From the front-line perspective that informed Jenkins' reading, however, the US was clearly losing the war. The main problem, according to Jenkins, was the USAF's operational definition of the enemy and, more broadly, of war itself:

War is regarded as a series of conventional battles between two armies in which one side will lose and, accepting this loss as decisive, will sue for peace. The losing side will be determined primarily by personnel losses. Essentially it is a strategy of attrition, and its principal criterion for success is the number of enemy soldiers killed in action. [...] The defects that make this concept inoperable in Vietnam are obvious. ⁷⁰

35.

By the conventional measures in use at the time to determine success through verified enemy kills, the USAF was winning the war in every respect. Jenkins asked "so what"?

We *are* winning, but we must keep winning indefinitely. The most damaging indictment of our concept of warfare is that our military superiority and successes on the battlefield do not challenge the enemy's political control of the people, which he maintains by his promises of a better society and, when that fails, by intimidation and terror. Our

military strategy may be, as I believe it is, irrelevant to the situation. ⁷¹

36.

Jenkins began articulating his unorthodox views as a member of the Long Range Planning Group at MACV headquarters in Saigon in 1969. Although his clear call for a radical change in military measures, definitions, and practices went generally unheeded in Vietnam, his persistent, logical arguments brought him to the attention of military strategists and policy researchers. In 1972 RAND published Jenkins' analysis of the Vietnam conflict as "The Unchangeable War," beginning a relationship between the analyst and the Corporation that endures to this day. RAND didn't want Jenkins to study only the military, however -- rather, they needed someone who could help the military and policy makers understand a relatively new phenomenon: terrorism.

Al-Qaeda, 2003

37.

Bruce Hoffman, writing in 2003, echoes Jenkins' notion regarding the problem of locating the enemy articulated over 30 years before:

The fundamental nature and character of terrorism changed with 9/11 and moreover has continued to change and evolve since then. It is becoming increasingly difficult to categorize or pigeonhole as an identifiable phenomenon, amenable to categorization or clear distinction. The traditional way of understanding terrorism and looking at terrorists based on organizational definitions and attributes in some cases is no longer relevant. ⁷²

38.

Like Jenkins, Hoffman is critical of notions of military victories as representative of any tangible solution to a broader problem, in this case the problem of al-Qaeda. Hoffman differs from Jenkins in a number of ways, however, with the most obvious difference being the relative importance given to being able to locate the enemy at all. For Jenkins, the crucial problem was devising more effective techniques of locating and engaging the enemy. By

contrast, Hoffman articulates the notion of an unlocatable enemy, questioning whether al-Qaeda exists in the traditional sense of an organization at all. This, Hoffman tells us, is the group's strength, and the fact of its amorphous structure makes it possible for al-Qaeda to act. By this reasoning, it is almost beside the point to spend a great deal of time trying to fully understand "what" al-Qaeda is -- rather, given that "the metric of success for the terrorists has become simply the ability to act, "it is more useful to try to predict and prevent terrorist *events*, since they can arise anywhere, at any time, for any reason.⁷³ Hoffman favorably cites Israel's concept of "mega-terrorism" whereby any violent act is, under certain conditions, considered terrorist.⁷⁴ While Hoffman may not have found the enemy, he has certainly re-located the battlefield that Jenkins realized had been lost; that battlefield is the everyday. Yet, in stating the problem in this way, Hoffman is only articulating something RAND researchers had known for years.

Malaya 1948-1960

39.

Scrambling for answers as to why the war in Vietnam was failing so disastrously, RAND researchers turned to a comparative analysis of the British Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs and "The Briggs Plan." Facing a phantasmic enemy in colonial Malaya, Briggs devised a plan in early 1950 that dispensed with traditional notions of enemy and civilian and imagined the battlefield as a *total space*, thus making the organization of populations a more pressing concern than the elimination of specific enemy bodies. The Briggs Plan worked quite well, destroying the insurgent Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) by the mid-1950s.⁷⁵ In his 1972 report comparing the success of the Briggs Plan with the catastrophe of US counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam (Strategic Hamlets, The Phoenix Program), R.W. Komer summarizes why the Briggs Plan worked:

Success was achieved by the meshing of many civilian-military programs, each of which interacted with the others. If there was one element on which the all others depended it was the increasingly effective Police Special Branch intelligence. But

without improving local security and growing cooperation from the population such intelligence gathering would have been far more difficult. Improving local security, largely a police effort, freed the army to go after the insurgents in the jungle, which it did with growing success. Resettlement of squatters, plus effective population and food controls, made it more and more difficult for the guerillas to get support. Development programs, social services, and the move toward popular enfranchisement and political independence won increasing rural support. And all these programs were effectively integrated by a unified British-Malayan management system at all key levels -- another essential ingredient of success. ⁷⁶

40.

A total program, utilizing the combined techniques of the military, law enforcement, civil authorities and social science, made 'success' possible. What is not evident in Komer's statement is the fact that nearly a seventh of the Malayan population (estimated at 500,000) was forcibly relocated into "New Villages", where they could be counted, monitored, and taught, in order to capture or kill a few thousand actual combatants. The Briggs Plan was firmly grounded in statistical measures (i.e. 'sensing the population'); however, the scope of the plan went well beyond simply locating and counting combatants. Distinguishing armed guerillas from the rural Chinese peasants that, willingly or not, provided them material support was for Briggs a mere technical matter. The British in the early 1950s understood the changing nature of warfare and everyday life in the modern world in a manner that RAND would adopt nearly 20 years later (foreshadowing later nomenclature, they designated the insurgents in Malaya "Communist Terrorists" or "CTs"). Versions of the Briggs Plan were tried in Vietnam but failed miserably. By the early 1970s RAND wanted to know why American tactics modeled on aspects of the Briggs Plan (such as the Strategic Hamlet program) failed where the earlier Briggs plan was successful. Komer, writing for RAND, noted that simply finding and physically eradicating the enemy was only a small part of the Briggs Plan -- arguably, this narrow military function was almost peripheral to the Plan itself. The Americans in Vietnam didn't understand the *totality* of Briggs' orientation. Komer's colleague

Brian Jenkins, however, seemed to be paying closer attention.

41.

Brian Jenkins formally wrote for RAND as a military expert in the 1970s and 80s. This relatively narrow definition of his proper subject and audience, however, did not sit easily with his singular focus on the phenomenon of *terrorism*. Jenkins "initial writings are marked by futile attempts to define terrorism as a new type of warfare. Over time, his reports show an increasing willingness to address terrorism as a phenomenon by consciously blurring long-held distinctions between civilians and combatants rather than simply refining these terms or adding new categories."⁷⁷ Gradually, the lessons of Malaya and Vietnam began to emerge more forcefully in his writing, and by the 1980s Jenkins begins to articulate a remarkably consistent message:

We may be on the threshold of an era of armed conflict in which limited conventional warfare, guerilla warfare, and international terrorism will coexist, with governments and sub-national entities employing them individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or simultaneously -- and having to defend against them. Warfare in the future may be less destructive than that in the first half of the twentieth century, but it may also be less coherent. **Warfare will cease to be finite.** The distinction between war and peace will become more ambiguous and complex. Armed conflict will not be confined by national frontiers. Local belligerents will mobilize foreign patrons. Terrorists will attack foreign targets both at home and abroad. It will be necessary to develop capabilities to deal with -- if not wage -- all three models of armed conflict, perhaps simultaneously.⁷⁸ The distinction between war and peace will dissolve.⁷⁹

42.

Jenkins was conceptualizing a form of everlasting war, whereby the tactics of living become difficult to distinguish from the tactics of war. He was unsentimental about this present/future state of affairs. While he grants that such a situation is dangerous, Jenkins is also quite firm in his insistence that perpetual war as a

form of life is still logical, knowable, and therefore predictable.

43.

Bruce Hoffman's writings during the early 1990s take issue with Jenkins' notion that, as ubiquitous as terrorism may be/may become, it is still primarily theatrical political violence.⁸⁰ Terrorism is not about politics, Hoffman argued; it is increasingly located in the non-logical, transcendental realm. In his words, it is now "holy terror":

What is particularly striking about 'holy terror' compared to purely 'secular terror,' however, is the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world view that the 'holy terrorist' embraces. [...] Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral, or practical constraints that seem to affect other terrorists.⁸¹

44.

Hoffman was primarily referring to so-called "Islamic terrorists" here, although he mentions many others: white supremacists in America, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the PLO, and the IRA, just to name a few. By telescoping a notion of modern terrorism back in time, Hoffman cites historic groups such as the Assassins, the Zealots, and the Thugs as earlier manifestations of the holy terrorist. Quoting scholar David C. Rapoport, Hoffman asserts that the 20th Century definition of terrorism formulated by Jenkins was incomplete, referring only to a narrow strata of "political terrorists."⁸² Jenkins' notion of terrorism as theatre was dangerously wrong for Hoffman, who suggests that terrorists "execute their terrorist acts for no audience but themselves." Rather, "holy terrorists" are able to perpetrate "[an] almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of targets." Hoffman named this form of life *total war*.⁸³

The National Office for Combating Terrorism (NOCT), December 2000

45.

The specific plan for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security existed before September 11, 2001. Although the proper name was different (National Office for Combating Terrorism), the department suggested by the RAND-sponsored James Gilmore⁸⁴-chaired Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (1999-2002) is essentially the same.⁸⁵The understanding of terrorism as a total phenomenon that Jenkins and Hoffman had been articulating for the previous 30 years was slowly being actualized. The Gilmore Advisory Panel, in its Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress, suggested a specific, detailed plan for the creation of a centralized agency to deal with domestic terrorism. This report was submitted to the President and Congress on December 15, 2000 -- some nine months *before* 9/11.

46.

The Gilmore Advisory Panel essentially recommended a perpetual Briggs Plan for the United States. Although written in a time before the USA Patriot Act (thus the authors of the report were quite concerned about the impression that a National Office for Combating Terrorism would resemble a police state to some), the broad recommendations closely resemble the original Briggs Plan, with the exception that the military must not appear to be the lead agency in handling incidents of domestic terrorism. Nonetheless, intelligence gathering (both domestic and international), research and development programs, health and medical programs, and domestic preparedness programs were all brought together under the proposed NOCT. Interestingly, the report notes that the primary task of the suggested NOCT is to provide an overarching structure to coordinate "all relevant capabilities, most of which are not dedicated exclusively to combating terrorism."⁸⁶In other words, the plan envisioned adapting local, state, and federal services into a mobile bureaucratic structure that would perpetually address itself to terrorism. The corporate network model is evident here; the NOCT would function as a linear, networked structure that would utilize the specificity of the local to pursue a larger goal of combating terrorism.

47.

The concepts put forward over the years by Jenkins and Hoffman are evident in the Gilmore Advisory Panel reports. Both agree that terrorism will never end and can arise anywhere. Although there is some hope to predict specific terrorist events and effectively respond to current ones, the general notion articulated by the Panel report is that terrorism is a "way of life." As such, the state must handle it in a way appropriate to something perpetual and total. As in Malaya and Vietnam, the state battles an enemy that cannot easily be located. It faces violent tactics that arise out of the everyday, and cannot hope to ever achieve peace, in that true peace can only come with the end of a declared, identifiable war. Terrorism is now like the weather, the market, or anything else popularly regarded as natural. In short, for the RAND experts who have been sensing these days well before they began, it is *life*.⁸⁷

48.

How is this new form of life to be governed? Firmly in keeping with the intellectual tradition of think tanks, Hoffman turns to the world of business for an answer. Here he is testifying before the United States Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence on October 8, 2001:

Bin Laden [...] is perhaps best viewed as a "terrorist CEO": essentially having applied business administration and modern management techniques learned both at university and in the family's construction business to the running of a transnational terrorist organization. Indeed, what bin Laden apparently has done is to implement for al-Qa"ida the same type of effective organizational framework or management approach adapted by corporate executives throughout much of the industrialized world. Just as large, multinational business conglomerates moved during the 1990s to flatter, more linear, and networked structures, bin Laden did the same with al-Qaeida.⁸⁸

49.

Although Rand's own scholars disagree as to just what al-Qaeda is, Hoffman, Jenkins, and the Gilmore Advisory Panel all recommend that the Department of Homeland Security be organized "along the same lines". Jenkins, in his own testimony before Congress, noted that the decentralized, linear, structure of

Homeland Security, whereby local units are instantly linked to a centralized body and thus exercise some autonomy over their specific strategies and techniques, can easily be accomplished, because "corporations do it all the time."⁸⁹ At such a point we find ourselves unexpectedly close to the concept (managerial science) – affect (threat perception) linkage with which we began our analysis of the RAND Corporation as it appeared in the 1940s. In the intervening period the conceptual- managerial model has changed, from centralization to decentralized "network structures" (as the fashionable jargon has it these days) both as a mode of thought and of action, even as the affective tendency retains much of its constitutive panic and anxiety. In many ways we have returned, differently, to Robert McNamara, the problem of security, ever-present threats and the urgent reorganization of the Department of Defense on corporate lines.

Conclusion

50.

Let us turn again to the questions with which we began this essay. What are the implications of this argument for those of us who are invested in the future of the anti-war movement? It is clear that Richard Cheney, for instance, is a far more crucial expression of the above network we outline than George W. Bush, who appears as nothing more than an engaging distraction, with enough charming gaffes, smirks and turns of phrases to keep all of our email accounts clogged up for months at a time.

51.

Closer to our domain of intellectual activity, the crucial questions are those regarding the future of radical scholarship, or more sharply stated, the present non-existence of an actually radical perspective. Here we might delineate the problems along the inter-related lines we describe from the outset: concepts, affects and temporality. Conceptually, we have tried to describe the foundational thought of think tank practice: Good government looks like good business.⁹⁰ The problem arises when we are asked to pose alternatives. If governance is not necessarily the same as business management, then what is it to be? A redefinition of the relationship between technology, economics, military and the government becomes more complicated given that these are not entirely irrelevant articulations. In other words, few people would

disagree that in some sense, as long as there are governments, their spending should be efficient and well coordinated, or that contemporary science has massive infrastructural costs as a result of which funding capabilities rest in large part either with the State or with large-scale commerce.

52.

A slightly different conceptual question arises regarding the problem of knowledge: Is there a difference between the early RAND-McNamara-Hitch dream of non-partisan research and the self-avowedly conservative advocacy groups such as the Heritage Foundation, given that the former were not any less disastrous? Put differently, are we willing to concede any room for notions of objectivity or empirical evidence, notions somewhat out of sync with contemporary social theory?⁹¹ This doesn't seem to be a question that we can simply wish away. What are we willing to recognize as research? Organizations such as the Heritage Foundation increasingly demand and set the standard for "timely" and "relevant" research agendas and products. What manner of "untimely" work will we be willing to defend? Epistemologically this is also a question of what capabilities we are willing to claim for knowledge (to predict the future, to ascertain the past?) and on what basis (empirical evidence, intuition, conjecture, mathematical calculation?). If part of the task has been to divest oneself of claims to authority ("multiple, plural readings are possible", "ours is only one possible interpretation among others"), as most self-reflexive anthropology and history have been doing for some time now, in what ways might it be possible to intervene in, or interrupt the existing alignments between intellectual work and coagulations of power, given that these are most often produced by those most willing to claim certainty and conviction?

53.

Affectively, the current social panic being generated around Homeland Security, ties in quite well with the ever-present "threat perception" that structures the analytical procedures of think tanks, very much an inheritance of the Cold War period. How does one break such ingrained thinking-feeling habits? But some might protest: are we saying that the current sense of panic is entirely false? True and false are all but irrelevant categories in relation to the way in which we are trying to pose the problem of affect, in this case, as closely linked to the question of temporality. This

generalized sense of panic traverses different domains, generating an overwhelming and blinding sense of intellectual urgency and immediacy, a "hyper-presentness" that seems to dominate these questions, with various groups, often with drastically opposing political views, falling over each other to announce the emergency, the unprecedented newness of the present moment. In this essay we have tried to draw out both an existing intellectual-institutional network of power along with its conditions of possibility and emergence, as well as the much longer, subterranean genealogies of recent concepts, practices and situations. As a result the categories of past, present and future become more complicated analytically, since it is hard to say when something is definitively in the past (Is the Cold War over? Such a question would be as relevant in Afghanistan as it is in the United States.) What we have here are differing levels of the *actual*, the *potential* and the *eventual*. In this sense the idea of a "post-Sept. 11 era" is all but absurd to us, in that the event itself, in its subsequent effects has actualized a field of *potentialities* that had been incipient from at least the 1950s onwards. On a previous trajectory in our essay we showed how RAND created a field of potential that was actualized in the Heritage foundation. This is also to remind us that other actualizations might become possible, eventually.

54.

Further, it is here, on these conceptual terms that think tanks differ most drastically from the "hyper-presentness" we have criticized in ourselves and in the anti-war movement. From systems analysis to "alternative futures" scenario constructions, think tanks have consistently laid claims to map the future, i.e. to claim it as theirs, most crucially by tapping into both productive and deadly relationships with technology, sensing new realms of potential oriented towards the eventual. This is not praiseworthy in itself. It is, however, a mode of operation to which forms of "refusal" will have to be creatively constructed --and not only as negations. How can we assert alternative claims to the future? Will it be possible to forge new, positive relationships with emergent technological forms that are not completely overwritten by the demands and imperatives of commerce or the military? Often this will have to take place by redirecting their own technological outputs towards completely different capabilities, as has been the case to a certain extent with the "activist" uses of the Internet contributing to the emergence of, for example, the World

Social Forum. Although still very much in the realm of the potential, we might also consider the internationalist possibilities that could be achieved through a public appropriation of the Babylon Project. This project, currently housed in the Pentagon, at DARPA's Information Processing Technology Office (IPTO), aims to provide "real time, two-way, natural language speech translation interfaces". If it were to be redirected towards ends other than the presently conceived one of combat, new forms of conversation, association or experimentation, might become possible, eventually. Put differently, what will disobedience look like, in enabling or sustainable forms, in the face of the pervasive, mobile and powerful networks that have emerged over the past few decades? Such a question is easier to pose than to answer. Most "liberal" accounts of "conservative" think tanks end with the exhortation to "build our own networks". But without concrete suggestions such statements quickly begin to sound like empty pieties (quite apart from the fact that it leaves little place for those who find themselves at odds with both the "liberal" and the "conservative" ends of the American political spectrum). What exactly will "our" networks do? What knowledge apparatus will sustain such networks (as for instance, a particular movement of economics as a discipline both participated in and enabled the rise of think tanks)? At present, none of these questions have readily available answers. At the very least, we hope to contribute to the energies of such a conversation, attentive to the situation in which we find ourselves at present. Please continue.

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NOTES

¹This group, named the "Coming Community" has begun research on four specific military/political vectors of contemporary globalization: a) U.S. based think tanks, b) the concept of "Corporate Social Responsibility" and its deployment by international institutions such as the World Bank, c) legal internationalism and national culpability, and d) war and childhood. This paper is based on the initial research report by the first vector of inquiry.

²Philip Zelikow, *The National Interest*. Spring 2003. *The Transformation of National Security*.

³We make the link between concepts and affects following on from philosophical work such as Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1994), Brian Massumi's *Parables for the Virtual* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), or William Connolly's *Neuropolitics: Thinking*

Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: Univ. Minnesota Press, 2002) within political theory and Antonio Damasio's *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003) within neuroscience.

⁴ Ida Hoos *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, c1983.; David Jardini. "Out of the Blue Yonder: The Transfer of Systems Thinking from the Pentagon to the Great Society, 1961-1965." In Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes, eds., *Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After*, pp. 311-357. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000. Kleinman 1995

⁵ Jardini, "Blue Yonder, p. 314

⁶ The corpus of literature around Robert McNamara does not seem to pose the following problem: while one cannot doubt his powerful influence on the 20th century, can we consider his story a "success"? As regards the department of defense, McNamara's autobiography *In Retrospect* (New York Times Books, 1995) as also the recent film *Fog of War* (2003), which emerges out of it, would indicate quite the opposite. McNamara describes the Vietnam conflict, the first war conducted under the reorganized Department of Defense as an unmitigated failure primarily because technical optimization and weapons-testing objectives took precedence over any other form of analysis, a difficulty further compounded by the massive centralization of authority which the reorganization process had already accomplished. What about the other domains in which McNamara was involved, with the Ford Motor Company beforehand and the World Bank afterwards? Business histories are replete with stories of the "collapse" of the American automobile industry, the takeover of the market by Japanese companies and the decline of manufacturing cities such as Detroit. In contemporary development discourse it is customary for most NGOs these days, both mainstream and alternative to critique "top-down" models of development. What they are referring to, knowingly or unknowingly, is precisely the McNamara World Bank model of centralized authority from the 1970s. Even the World Bank, for the past several years, has been an enthusiastic proponent of "decentralization". Clearly then, McNamara's story is not one of

untrammeled achievement in any of the domains which he supposedly dominated. However, in this research report we are less concerned with notions of "success" or "failure" and more with the networks, institutions and concepts which were subsequently enabled for future deployment. Another crucial issue in relation to McNamara: a film such as *Fog of War* describes his regrets over the Vietnam War and ends by saying that he spent the rest of his career "leading the fight against global poverty as President of the World Bank." In American political science discourse this would be his transformation from a "realist" to an "idealist." However, what such a description completely elides is that in terms of the conceptual apparatus at work (applied mathematics), organizational structuring (centralization) and objectives (fighting the threat of third world communism as an outgrowth of endemic poverty) his job with both the Department of Defense and the World Bank remained remarkably similar.

⁷ Palmer 1975

⁸ Enthoven 1971 quoted in Jardini , 'Blue Yonder," p. 323

⁹ Marshall Kaplan & Peggy Cuciti, *The Great Society and Its Legacy: Twenty Years of US Social Policy*.

Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1986.

¹⁰ James L. Sundquist, ed. *On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience* (NY: Basic Books, 1969)

¹¹ Jardini, "Blue Yonder," p.343.

¹² For a detailed list of think tanks and their funding sources, particularly those set up on private capital, see Jean Stefanic & Richard Delgado, *No Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America's Social Agenda* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press, 1996); and W.G. Domhoff, *The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in America* (New York: A. de Gruyter, 1990).

¹³ Domhoff,. *Power Elite*.

¹⁴ Donald Abelson. *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact*

of Public Policy institutes. Montreal & Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2002, p. 132.

¹⁵ Richard Holwill, ed.. *The First Year*. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1982.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 138.

¹⁷ Barnes 1993

¹⁸ Kitfield 1999

¹⁹ Heritage Foundation *Annual Report* 1997, p.4

²⁰ Keeping in mind that quite apart from the problem of "conservatism", it is precisely the "liberalism" of Jimmy Carter's Trilateral Commission and Bill Clinton's NAFTA which are under attack outside the U.S., for instance with the anti-corporate globalization movement which poses "neo-liberalism" as its primary target.

²¹ See, Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect* (New York Times Books, 1995) and *Fog of War*, 2003.

²² Read Kathleen Tyman, "A Decade-Long Heritage of Conservative Thought", *Washington Post*, 4 October 1983, for an account of how Congressional aides Paul Weyrich and Edwin Feulner came up with the idea for the Heritage Foundation, as a think tank that would provide "timely and policy-relevant information."

²³ Abelson, *Do think tanks matter?*, p.83

²⁴ Alvin & Heidi Toffler, "The New Intangibles," In J. Arquilla & D. Ronfeldt, eds., *Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, p.xiii-xxiv. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1997) www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880

²⁵ Quade 1967: 3.

²⁶ Jardini, "Blue Yonder," p.317

²⁷ John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, credited with founding the field of game theory in the 1940s were frequent RAND consultants.

²⁸ RAND Corporation. *Fiftieth Anniversary Report. RAND Project Air Force, 196-1996*. Available at www.rand.org.

²⁹ James Jay Carafano. "An Appropriator's Guide to Homeland Security. *Background*, June 7, 2004. www.heritage.org.

³⁰ Carafano, "An Appropriator's Guide," p. 3

³¹ Alvin & Heidi Toffler, *Future Shock* (NY: Random House, 1970); *Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century* (NY: Little Brown, 1993). On the temporality of preemption, see especially "Change Accelerates: We can all expect more preemptive strikes." www.toffler.com/feature/fd_article

³² A & H Toffler, "The New Intangibles", in *Athena's Camp*, pp. xiii-xxiv

³³ Ibid, p.xiv.

³⁴ For example, J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, M. Zanini, "Networks, Netwar and Information-Age Terrorism." In *Countering the New Terrorism*, pp. 39-84 (Rand, 1999)

³⁵ David Ronfeldt & Armando Martínez, "A Comment on the Zapatista Netwar," in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, eds., *Netwars*, pp. 372

³⁶ Luther Gerlach & Virginia Hine, *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970)

³⁷ Ronfeldt & Martínez, "A Comment," p. 373

³⁸ This is precisely the criticism Ida Hoos makes about RAND's systems analysis approach in the 1970s, that it often turns into a

self-fulfilling prophecy given the investment made in producing a particular future and justifying expenditures after the fact. See Ida Hoos, *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* (1970)

³⁹ Rondfeldt & Martínez, "A Comment," p. 375

⁴⁰ Tofflers, "New Intangibles," p.xviii

⁴¹ Leslie Wayne, "America's For Profit Secret Army," *The Sunday New York Times*, "Money and Business" Section, October 13, 2002, pp.1, 10-11.

⁴² Richard Szafranski, "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," In Arquilla & Rondfeldt, eds. *Athena's Camp*, pp.395-416 (originally published in *Military Review*, Nov. 1994, pp.41-55)

⁴³ Ibid, 396.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 399

⁴⁵ Ibid, 404.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 405 & 409

⁴⁷ Ibid, 405- 407

⁴⁸ Martin C. Libicki, "The Small and The Many" In Athena's Camp, pp.191-216

⁴⁹ Ibid, 192

⁵⁰ Ibid, 192-193

⁵¹ Ibid, 196

⁵² See http://www.darpa.mil/body/off_programs.html for DARPA's information retrieval research.

⁵³ Christopher Marquis "The Right and Wrong Stuff of Thinking Outside the Box" in *The New York Times*, July 31, 2003.

⁵⁴ See Senator Patrick Leahy's letter dated January 10, 2003 to Attorney General John Ashcroft posing data mining questions in *IWS: The Information Warfare Site* at <http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/tia/total-information-awareness.htm>. See also Senator Tom Harkin's letter dated January 13, 2003 requesting Poindexter hearing at <http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/tia/harkin.htm>

⁵⁵ Marquis 2003, Harkin 2003, Leahy 2003.

⁵⁶ Pennywise 2002, "Genoa II" in *Cog News: What's on your Mind?* at http://cognews.com/1062569953/index_html

⁵⁷ Ronald Bailey 2003, "Betting on Terror: Why Futures Markets in Terror and Assassination are a Good Idea" in *Reasononline* at <http://www.reason.com/rb/rb073003.html>

⁵⁸ CNN.com 07/31/2003

⁵⁹ Congressional Record September 24, 2003, available at <http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/tia/tia-terminated.htm>

⁶⁰ John Poindexter "Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the DARPR Tech 2002 Conference" on August 2nd 2002 at <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html>

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Poindexter "Finding the Face in Terror" in *The New York Times*, September 10, 2003.

⁶⁵ See <http://www.darpa.mil/ato/programs/unique.htm> for a description of DARPA's "odor-types" program.

⁶⁶See <http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/babylon/index.htm> for a description of DARPA's Babylon (two-way language translation) project. See also <http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/tides/index.htm> for the TIDES "multiple languages" program.

⁶⁸Brian Michael Jenkins is currently a Senior Advisor specializing in terrorism for the RAND Corporation.

⁶⁹See <http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/babylon/index.htm> for a description of DARPA's Babylon (two-way language translation) project. See also <http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/tides/index.htm> for the TIDES "multiple languages" program.

⁷⁰Jenkins *The Unchangeable War*, (prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, RM-6278-1-ARPA). Santa Monica: RAND, September 1972, 4.

⁷¹Jenkins 1972, 4 -- emphasis in the original

⁷²Bruce Hoffman. *Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment*, (P-8078). Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, 16. Bruce Hoffman is currently Vice-President, External Affairs, and Director of the RAND Corporation's office in Washington, D.C. His formal expertise pertains to the global security environment, terrorism and other emerging threats, domestic and international terrorism, and the Middle East.

⁷³Hoffman, *Al-Qaeda*, p. 16

⁷⁴*Ibid*, 15-16.

⁷⁵Although martial law remained in effect in Malaya until 1960, most historians conclude that the insurgency had been essentially broken by 1955-56.

⁷⁶R.W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, (prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, R-957-ARPA). Santa Monica: RAND, February 1972, 76. Robert W. Komer served in a variety of positions and emerged as a key State Department Foreign Policy expert, and was directly involved in

American foreign policy regarding Southeast Asia during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For more regarding Komer's specific involvement in American foreign policy in Southeast Asia during this time refer to Mathew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁷⁷Jenkins, *Terrorism Works -- Sometimes*(P-5217), Santa Monica: RAND, April 1974; *Rand's Research on Terrorism*, (P-5969). Santa Monica: RAND, August 1977; *International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities*, (P-6117), Santa Monica: RAND, May 1978; *The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems*, (P-6563), Santa Monica: RAND, December 1980.

⁷⁸Jenkins *International Terrorism: The Other World War*, (A Project AIR FORCE report prepared for the United States Air Force), Santa Monica: RAND, November 1985, 20; emphasis in original.

⁷⁹Jenkins *New Modes of Conflict*, (prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency, R-3009-DNA), Santa Monica: RAND, June 1983, vi.

⁸⁰Jenkins famously wrote in 1975, "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead,"("International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,"in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds., *International Terrorism and World Security*, New York: Wiley, 1975, 15). Despite more recent events such as 9/11 with its markedly higher casualty rates, Jenkins continues to defend this statement, noting during his testimony before Congress on November 15, 2001, that "I have never counted myself among the "Apocalypticians","(Jenkins, *Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats*, (CT-187). Santa Monica: RAND, November 2001, 1).

⁸¹Bruce Hoffman, *"Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative*, (P-7834). Santa Monica: RAND, 1993, 2.

⁸²Specifically, Hoffman quotes the following from Rapoport: "[R]eligion provided [until the 19thCentury] the only acceptable justifications for terror,"in "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in

Three Religious Traditions,"*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984, 668-672.

⁸³Hoffman 1993, 3.

⁸⁴James Gilmore is the current Governor of Virginia and served as the Chair of the 22-member Advisory Panel.

⁸⁵The First and Second Annual Reports were submitted before September 11, 2001 and thus were not generated in response to any one terrorist event. The Third Annual Report, submitted to The President and Congress on December 15, 2001, take for granted that the newly-created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will generally be constituted to assume the functions of the previously recommended National Office for Combating Terrorism. Interestingly, in the Advance Recommendations on Strategy and Structure for the Fourth Annual Report (submitted November 15, 2002) revises the Advisory Panel's previous position on DHS, drawing a distinction between the now-existent DHS, the FBI, the CIA, and a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) suggested by the Panel. In the view of the Panel, the evolving DHS is hampered by a continued distinction between foreign and domestic terrorism and the potential conflicts of interest related to DHS regarding powers of surveillance and enforcement.

⁸⁶Advisory Panel 2000, v

⁸⁷While the totality of war ("war is no longer a military problem") has been an enduring theme in the RAND Corporation since the 1940s, the problem emerges more forcefully after the Vietnam war, gradually entering military commonsense as the "winning their hearts and minds" problem, further re-configured in recent RAND writings, as in our discussion above on "neo-cortical warfare." According to a recent document from the Hoover Institution, the problem of dealing with the threat of terrorism has two main parts, the military (or "kinetic", as it is called in the Pentagon)...and the non-kinetic parts...often euphemized as the "drain the swamp" or "hearts and minds" problem. (Garfinkle 2003: xv)

⁸⁸Hoffman 2001, 13

⁸⁹Jenkins 2003, 8

⁹⁰In a recent article, "Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neocon utopia", Naomi Klein describes the situation in Iraq in relation to the Bush administration's dream of creating an exemplary oasis of "privatization" in the Middle East. We might align her analysis with ours by pointing out how the military-governmental actions she describes are very much the habits of thought we have tried to draw out in the above argument, moved by concepts (business management) and affects (panic, anxiety, threat-perception) spiraling towards their worst consequences. How might such habits of thought be broken? This is a question not only of negations ("exposing", "uncovering", "shaming") but also of positively developing a new image of thought.

⁹¹Here our worries are somewhat similar to those of Bruno Latour in his article "Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern" *Critical Inquiry* 30(Winter 2004). However, we find ourselves completely dissatisfied with the terms along which he breaks up the problem. Each of the questions he asks, "How to add rather than subtract from reality?", "How to understand a thing, not as a void but rather as a gathering of forces?" have been quite conclusively answered, several times over, to take just one instance, within the philosophical corpus of Gilles Deleuze with the concept of the "assemblage" and the affirmative power of ontological positivity.

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